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My paper aims to use the philosophical resources of Saint 
Augustine’s thought, particularly as found in the City of 
God, in order to sketch a basic worldview which can educate 
and lead people towards living lives that promote sustainable 
development. Specifically, I wish to show how Saint 
Augustine’s concepts of order, rightly ordered love, and 
temporal peace can serve as material to create a rough 
metaphysical framework in which human beings are 
understood to be an integrated part of a greater whole which 
is the earth. The ethical corollary of this framework is that 
human beings should act in such a way that does not damage 
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integrity. In doing this, I also hope to show that Saint 
Augustine’s thought can still have relevance for 
contemporary issues. 
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he concept of “Sustainable Development” has been an 
important issue ever since its definition was formulated 
by the World Commission on the Environment and 
Development in 1987.1 An equally important issue, however, 
is the discussion on how to implement the ideas of 
sustainable development in everyday life. One suggestion 
regarding this is that there is a need for individuals to imbibe 
a “holistic worldview” that sees human beings as an 
integrated part of the universe, instead of being isolated from 
it. For example, Moacir Gadotti stresses the necessity of a 
“cosmic perspective” that takes into account that human 
beings and their activities are ultimately connected to other 
beings of the earth and the universe.2 Gadotti claims that 
 
1 Alan Reid, “Values in Sustainable Development,” Teaching Geography 21, 
no. 4 (1996): 168, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23754452.a. 
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Instituto Paulo Freire, 2004), 25, last modified 2016, http://earthcharter.org/ 
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such a perspective can lead to the adoption of lifestyles that 
can preserve the well-being of both humanity and the 
natural environment since people will become more 
sensitive precisely to the fact that they are an integrated part 
of a whole which they should respect and not damage.  
In this paper, I wish to contribute to Gadotti’s idea by 
suggesting a possible resource for a holistic worldview that 
can, in turn, promote a way of life conducive to sustainable 
development. More precisely, I wish to utilize the philosophy 
of Saint Augustine of Hippo, particularly as it is found in the 
City of God, to make a rough sketch of a metaphysical and 
ethical framework for living sustainably. I believe that there 
are three connected concepts in Augustine’s philosophy 
which can serve as material for this framework. One is 
Augustine’s concept of order, while the other two are 
corollaries of these, namely, rightly ordered love and temporal 
peace.  
My paper will then proceed as follows: I will begin by 
discussing the definition of sustainable development and how 
it is a debated concept because of the different understandings 
that people have of it. I will then put forward Gadotti’s 
opinion that these different understandings stem from a lack 
of a holistic view of the world. I will then briefly discuss the 
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along with its corollary, ethical values, is necessary for 
sustainable living and thus what is also primarily necessary for 
sustainable development. After this, I will propose that the 
aforesaid philosophy of Augustine can serve as a resource for 
this holistic worldview. Before further exploring Augustine’s 
philosophy, I shall answer certain objections to applying his 
thought to the contemporary endeavor of sustainable 
development. After this, I shall elaborate the three aforesaid 
concepts of order, rightly ordered love, and temporal peace. 
In the penultimate section, I will attempt to utilize these 
concepts in order to provide a basic sketch of a holistic 
worldview for sustainable living. I will then end with a brief 
concluding remark. 
Sustainable Development and the Need  
for a Worldview for Sustainability 
The World Commission on Environment and 
Development, also called the Bruntdland Commission, defines 
sustainable development as “development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”3 This is a noticeably 
loose formulation, as it defines neither what needs to be 
sustained, nor what “development” actually means.4 According 
to Annick Hedlund-de Witt, the formulation was made in 
 
3 Reid, “Values in Sustainable Development,” 168. 
4 Annick Hedlund-de Witt, “Rethinking Sustainable Development: 
Considering How Different Worldviews Envision ‘Development’ and 
‘Quality of Life,’” Sustainability 6. (2014): 8312, doi: 10.3390/su6118310.  




order to accommodate the multiple meanings that people 
might attach to the concept, and so as to precisely foster 
cooperation among these peoples who might have different 
convictions.5 However, as broad as it might seem, sustainable 
development is not a totally vacuous concept. For Witt, 
sustainable development is essentially the attempt to 
combine economic growth with the conservation of the 
environment.6 He says that one of the insights expressed by 
the Bruntdland Commission is that economic and ecological 
well-being go hand-in-hand. Economies cannot hope to 
flourish if the methods that they use for growth are 
environmentally destructive with the environment itself as 
their main resource. Ultimately, the human race itself cannot 
preserve its own existence if its economies drain the natural 
resources of the planet in a much faster rate than the 
renewing of these resources. Sustainable development 
therefore seeks to support “human progress not just in a 
few pieces or years, but for the entire planet into the distant 
future.”7 
Despite this, sustainable development still remains a 
hotly contested concept.8 Some have interpreted sustainable 
development to primarily mean preserving the well-being of 
 
5 Hedlund-de Witt, “Rethinking Sustainable Development,” 8312. 
6 Ibid., 8313. 
7 Ibid., 8314. 
8 Sophia Imran, Korshed Alam and Narelle Beaumont, “Reinterpreting the 
Definition of Sustainable Development for a More Ecocentric Reorientation,” 
Sustainable Development 22. (2014): 135, doi: 10.1002/sd.537.  




the ecosystem.9 Others understand sustainable development as 
chiefly pertaining to human beings, and that stewardship of the 
environment is just a means to achieve this goal. 10  These 
ecocentric and anthropocentric conceptions, respectively, 
assume a dualism between nature and humanity which, 
however, need not be assumed. Indeed, it is this dualistic 
view which certain educators of sustainable development 
believe to be a part of the problem. Gadotti, for instance, 
stresses the fact that social and environmental problems 
should not be treated separately because they are ultimately 
connected. He considers the dualistic perspective as a lack of a 
holistic worldview, which sees all things as interconnected.11 It 
is this holistic view in turn which Gadotti believes necessary 
for sustainable development.  
Moreover, this holistic worldview should be lived out in 
practice. Gadotti believes that what is of primary importance 
in promoting sustainable development is that people adapt 
lifestyles that are sustainable and not wasteful of the planet’s 
resources. This requires that the emotional, rational, and 
intuitive capacities of people should be educated to care 
more for the earth. 12  Likewise, values that have concrete 
behavioral effects such as simplicity, austerity, and concern  
 
 
9 Imran, et al., “Reinterpreting,” 136. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Gadotti, “Education for Sustainable Development,” 8. 
12 Ibid., 22. 




for others, should be promoted by such an education.13 It is 
when people live sustainably, then, that sustainable development 
can become widespread, since a predominantly sustainable 
society can only come to be if the values of sustainability are 
already lived out by each of its members.14  This is also the 
opinion of other scholars such as Jesse and Eric Pappas, who 
envision “sustainable individuals” as the key or “foundation for 
action in social, economic, and environmental sustainability.”15 
Pappas defines such individuals as follows: 
Sustainable individuals are characterized by 
creating harmony, interconnection, and relatively 
high levels of self-awareness in their values, 
thoughts, behaviors, and actions as well as 
cultivating continued individual growth in their 
physical, emotional, social, philosophical, and 
intellectual abilities. Individual sustainability 
includes possessing a well-developed and 
demonstrated value system that acknowledges 
the importance and interconnectedness of all 
global biological and social systems, and our 
appropriate place within them.16 
 
13 Gadotti, “Education for Sustainable Development,” 22. 
14 Ibid., 21. 
15 Jesse Pappas and Eric Pappas, “The Sustainable Personality, Values and 
Behaviors in Individual Sustainability,” International Journal of Higher Education 4, 
no.1 (2015): 12, doi: 10.5430/ijhe.v4n1p12. 
16 Ibid. 




That sustainable individuals should have a “value system” 
that recognizes the interconnectedness of global systems 
resonates with Gadotti’s belief that people interested in 
living sustainably should adopt a new paradigm. Gadotti 
calls this the Earth’s paradigm and its chief purpose is to 
inform people that their “common destiny in the planet is to 
share life in the planet with others.” 17  People should be 
taught not to view the world as a compartmentalized 
thing, “composed [of] separate parts or bodies.”18 Rather, 
the universe is a “sacred and mysterious whole” in which 
what happens to one part resonates with the entirety.19 
Scholars such as Gadotti and Pappas believe that what is 
necessary for sustainable development is an alteration of 
behavior on the part of individuals. A person must begin to 
live in such a way that her actions become beneficial and not 
harmful to the world around her. Her life must manifest an 
efficient use of natural resources so that she does not 
deprive her fellow human beings, whether present or future, 
of the natural resources that they would need for their own 
well-being. This change of attitude in turn should go hand-
in-hand with, and indeed be a corollary of, a holistic 
understanding of the universe—one which sees humanity 
and the rest of creation as parts of an ordered whole. 
 
17 Gadotti, “Education for Sustainable Development,” 22. 
18 Ibid., 23. 
19 Ibid. 




Augustine’s Philosophy and Sustainable Development 
Objections 
As said above, I believe that the philosophy of Saint 
Augustine can serve as material from which to draw this 
holistic understanding of the world, along with its ethical 
corollaries. Now, Augustine’s philosophy might initially 
seem to be a strange choice for this purpose, as I foresee 
three objections with regards to using his philosophy for this 
contemporary issue of sustainable development. The first is 
that Augustine’s philosophy gives too much emphasis on the 
individual’s relationship with God, while giving little 
relevance to the world. The second is that it promotes 
authoritarianism, which, in turn, is no longer acceptable to 
the sensibilities of our contemporary world. The third 
objection has to do with the role of grace in Augustine’s 
thought. Augustine considers God’s grace as an 
indispensable element of any human attempt to achieve 
goodness. This seems to be difficult, even impossible, to 
integrate in a paradigm of sustainable development, where 
there is no necessary place for something like Augustine’s 
Christian God. I will answer these objections below, 
although I do not claim that these answers will definitively 
solve the difficulties of using Augustine’s philosophy for 
sustainable development. At best, I hope that my answers 
make it less improbable for Augustine’s thought to be 
appropriated for living sustainably. By giving these answers, I 




hope to provide a context for my interpretation of Augustine’s 
thought and its relation with other interpretations. 
Let me then address the first objection. There is an 
understanding of Augustine that views his philosophy as too 
focused on one’s relationship with God, to the point of 
ignoring the world. This is represented for example by 
Gordon Kaufman’s opinion of Augustine in his article, 
“Ecological Consciousness and the symbol ‘God’.”  For 
Kaufman, Augustine gives main interest only to “God and 
the soul,” while the other beings of creation, with the 
exception of angels, have mostly been left out in serious 
theological discussions.20 Uta Ranke-Heinemann also accuses 
Augustine of having an “urge to break away from everything 
earthly and beloved on this earth” and of ultimately having 
recourse to an “escapist version of Christianity,” due to 
him being influenced by ascetic Neo-Platonism.21  Indeed, 
Augustine himself seems to vindicate these opinions. After 
all, it is he who said in his Soliloquies that he desires to know 
only God and the soul and nothing more.22  Also, in the City 
of God, Augustine often expresses his dismal view of earthly 
life with all its hardships, in contrast to the happiness of 
eternal life in heaven. He also demolishes the belief of the  
 
 
20 Gordon D. Kaufman, “Ecological Consciousness and the Symbol ‘God,’” 
Buddhist-Christian Studies 20 (2000): 6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1390316. 
21 Both quotations cited are from: Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchs for the 
Kingdom (New York: Doubleday), 81. 
22 Soliloquia, 1.4. I have used the translation by Robert P. Russel (2008).  




philosophers that happiness can be had in earthly life, by 
enumerating the many miseries that plague man both on the 
individual and societal levels.23  Some of these miseries are 
disease, death, misunderstanding, and injustice, which 
Augustine believes will always harass humans while they live 
in this world.  
However, as Arthur Ledoux says, there is more to 
Augustine’s apparent contemptus mundi than meets the eye.  
For Ledoux, this focusing of Augustine on God and the self 
is not a way of escaping the world. Rather, it is the initial 
step in transforming one’s self to be able to transcend one’s 
own limitations due to sin, and be able to see and act upon 
the world in accordance with God’s will.24 For Augustine, 
union with God is the ultimate goal that human beings 
should strive for. However, Augustine believes that 
humanity’s sinfulness prevents them from achieving this. 
Thus, a person would need to distance herself from her own 
selfishness as well as the attractions of the world that 
accentuate such selfishness, in order to be united with God. 
His proclamations about the misery of earthly life, therefore, 
is for the purpose of leading the readers’ mind toward 
contemplating the absolute happiness one can attain 
through union with God, against which happiness in this 
 
23 De civ. Dei 19.4–10. Unless otherwise noted, I have used the abridged 
version of the translation by Gerald G. Walsh et al. (1958) in all citations. 
24 Arthur Ledoux, “A Green Augustine: On Learning to Love Nature Well,” 
Theology and Science 3, no. 3 (2005): 333–334, doi: 10.1080/14746700500317313. 




world pales in comparison.25 Instilling a certain devaluation 
for earthly life is a required step for desiring and achieving 
this union. Despite this, Augustine strongly believed that all 
creation is naturally good, being a manifestation of God’s 
own goodness and wisdom.26 
We can better see Augustine’s appreciation for creation 
by looking at his answers against his theological rivals, 
namely, the Manichees. The Manichees affirmed, unlike 
Christianity, that there were two eternal principles 
responsible for all things, one principle being good and the 
other evil. 27  The principle of good was attacked by the 
principle of evil in the beginning of time. This resulted in 
“portions” of the principle of good being trapped within 
bodies, which in turn are of the principle of evil. For the 
human being, this meant that her soul, which is of the 
principle of good, is caged in her evil body. Salvation then 
consisted of freeing the soul from the body and its carnal 
urges so that the soul may be reunited with the principle of 
good. The Manichees thus considered the physical world of 
bodies as evil and something to be transcended. Consequently, 
the Manichees attacked the Christian doctrine that the universe  
 
 
25 George Lawless, “Augustine’s Decentering of Asceticism,” in Augustine 
and His Critics: Essays in Honour of Gerald Bonner, ed. Robert Dodaro and George 
Lawless (New York: Routledge, 2000), 142. 
26 De civ. Dei, 11.21. 
27  Ronald J. Teske, Two Books on Genesis Against the Manichees and On the 
Literal Interpretation of Genesis: An Unfinished Book, vol. 84 in The Fathers of the 
Church (New York: Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 8. 




is ultimately good because of having been made by a good 
God. The Manichees’ objection to the Christian position 
may be summed up in two questions. One is that, if the 
Christian position is true, then what accounts for the 
existence of evil? The second is that if the Christians are 
right, then why do there seem to be useless creatures? 
Augustine’s reply to the first question is that evil is not a 
positive reality, but merely a privation, or lack of such a 
reality. Therefore, God cannot create evil, nor can evil be a 
principle equal with God. For instance, in his work, On 
Genesis Against the Manichees, Augustine ridicules the 
Manichees for thinking that the “darkness,” from which 
God separated the light in Genesis, signifies actual entities 
competing with God, since the darkness is not said to be 
created by God.28 Augustine says that the darkness simply 
signifies the lack of light before God created such light, and 
that the darkness is not a “something” that existed even 
before creation. Thus, it would be silly to think that this 
darkness contended with God, just as it is silly to think that 
silence literally fought against sound, or that nakedness 
fought against being clothed.29 The other side of this denial 
of the substantiality of evil would be Augustine’s affirmation 
of the natural goodness of all things. All natures, as he says, 
are good insofar as they exist because God made them to be 
 
28 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 1.4.7. I have used the translation of Ronald J. 
Teske (1991) in all citations.  
29 Ibid. 




good and because of this the whole universe “is filled with 
every kind of good.”30 
However, Augustine does not deny the reality of evil. In 
On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, Augustine affirms that 
evil indeed exists, though it is not found in the nature of 
things. On the contrary, “evil is either sin or the punishment 
of sin. Sin is nothing but the evil assent of free will, when we 
incline to those things which justice forbids and from which 
we are free to abstain. [Sin] does not lie in the things 
themselves, but in their illegitimate use.”31 Evil occurs when 
human beings desire and use things in a way that is 
contradictory with God’s ordained order for the universe. 
More will be said of this later in discussing rightly ordered 
love. As for the “punishment of sin,” Augustine means by 
this the fact that human beings are susceptible to death and 
all the bodily frailties that we know of today, in contrast to 
their original state before the fall. Consequently, certain 
beings, which previously could not harm man, such as 
ferocious animals, poisonous plants, and harsh elements 
have become dangerous and even fatal to him. Still, these 
beings are not intrinsically evil, because God created them 
with good natures. 
When it comes to the Manichees’ second objection which 
is that there seems to be creatures that are not good in the 
 
30 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 2.29.  
31 De Genesi ad litteram, 1.3. I have used the translation of Ronald J. Teske 
(1991). 




sense of being useless, Augustine’s reply is that these 
creatures only seem superfluous because humans have a 
limited view of the world and thus do not appreciate how 
each being contributes to the greater scheme of things. For 
Augustine, each individual thing contributes to the beauty of 
the whole universe. He gives a number of analogies to 
convey this idea32 and one is the human body. Certain parts 
of the human body may not be attractive, or as attractive, if 
considered in isolation. And yet if considered in terms of 
how they contribute to the beauty and unity of the entire 
body, then they will be better appreciated. Another analogy 
is that of a beautiful speech. The individual letter and 
syllables of such a speech are likely not as splendid as the 
speech itself. Indeed, they would be senseless if considered 
by themselves and not in unity with each other. The error of 
the Manichees, then, is that they focus only on the isolated 
creature and not its relation to the universe, when judging its 
worth. Furthermore, they judge the goodness of a creature 
based on its utility to human beings.33 But to do so betrays a 
very limited and anthropocentric kind of view, in which the 
value of everything is relative only to humans.  
From these answers to the Manichees, we can see how 
Augustine indeed acknowledged and appreciated creation’s 
value. The world, for him, was not something intrinsically  
 
 
32 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 1.21.32. 
33 Ibid., 1.16.26–27. 




evil that had to be transcended. Rather, the universe and its 
beauty were a manifestation of God’s benevolence. As such, 
all things, whether taken individually or taken together, are 
of their nature good. It is only due to the sinful wills of 
rational creatures, such as humans and angels, that evil was 
introduced into the world. One last thing to note is that we 
can see, from Augustine’s metaphor of the body, that his 
understanding of the universe does appear to resonate with 
Gadotti’s holistic view of the world. For both Gadotti and 
Augustine, the universe is a whole which consists of the 
harmonious connection of its parts. Furthermore, this whole 
should be treated with respect by man. For Gadotti, the 
reason for this is because the universe is “sacred” while for 
Augustine the reason is that the universe is a manifestation 
of God’s goodness. Finally, similar to Gadotti, Augustine 
believes that what happens to one part of this whole affects 
the whole itself. This can be seen when the latter says that if 
ever the body loses one of its parts, then the lost part, 
together with the other parts that still form the body, 
become ugly.34 
Let me go then to the second objection: Augustine’s 
philosophy promotes authoritarianism. I admit that there is 
a way of understanding Augustine’s political thought that 
leads to authoritarianism. This is especially true when one 
considers that elements in Augustine’s works themselves 
 
34 De Genesi contra Manichaeos, 1.21.32. 




appear to promote authoritarianism. For example, in the City 
of God, Augustine insists that the ideal Christian citizen 
should leave the governing of society to the people in 
authority, and that these Christians should not resist the 
abuses that they might experience from authority, unless 
such abuses prevent one from living out the Christian 
faith. 35  This is because the people in authority, whether 
secular or ecclesiastical, are chosen by God and it is the duty 
of Christians to accept their rule. The abuses of such 
authority should be accepted by the faithful with pious 
perseverance—these abuses being considered as means given 
by God for the faithful’s increase in virtue. Another example 
in Augustine’s thought that encourages authoritarianism is his 
belief in physically coercing people into believing a certain 
creed. This can be seen in Augustine’s dealing with the 
Donatists. After experiencing the violence that the Donatists 
afflicted on his fellow Catholics, and also after witnessing 
how certain Donatists that were forced to convert to 
Catholicism actually came to embrace that latter faith, 
Augustine became convinced that the state’s use of physical 
coercion against these aforesaid Donatists was warranted.36 
Putting these two examples together, it seems that 
Augustine’s philosophy would condone the idea that people 
 
35 Alan Ryan, On Politics (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 180. 
36  E.M. Atkins and Robert Dodaro, eds., Augustine: Political Writings 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), xxiii–xxiv. 




with institutional authority have the absolute right to impose 
the beliefs that they favor on those under their jurisdiction. 
However, there are alternative ways of interpreting 
Augustine’s thought that do not result in promoting 
authoritarianism. Examples of these are what Hoon Woo 
lists as two modern appropriations of Augustine’s political 
philosophy. The first is what Woo calls “soft realism.” Soft 
realism accepts Augustine’s view that state authority is 
indeed God-given, however it is “regarded as limited in [it’s] 
ability to achieve [it’s] moral ends and necessarily tolerant of 
diverse customs.”37 Though Woo does not explain further, 
what I think soft realism capitalizes on is Augustine’s belief 
that there can ultimately be no perfect society on earth, due 
to all human beings having a sinful nature. From this, it can 
be argued that the over-zealous desire of authorities to 
coercively impose upon others what to their mind is the 
right way of life may betray an inordinate desire to establish 
a perfect society here on earth, which is precisely what 
Augustine goes against. Those in authority should be wary 
of coercively imposing their beliefs on others, for such an 
intention may stem more from the sinful desire to dominate 
others, instead of a genuinely good desire of reforming 
them.  
 
37 B. Hoon Woo, “Pilgrim’s Progress in Society: Augustine’s Political Thought 
in The City of God,” Political Theology 16, no. 5 (2015): 427, doi:10.1179/ 
1462317X14Z.000000000113. 




Aside from soft-realism, Woo identifies a “confessional” 
appropriation of Augustine’s philosophy.38 This emphasizes 
the sinful nature of human beings in Augustine’s thought. It 
does not recommend any action on the part of institutions 
or people in authority, nor does it focus on purposely 
changing society at the macro-level. Rather, in this approach, 
the Christian prioritizes the overcoming of her own sinful 
condition which Woo calls the “‘monstrosity’ of [one’s] own 
divided will.”39 In a confessional approach, what is given 
importance is the personal transformation of a human being 
from her state of sinfulness into union with God. This 
approach also considers the condition of larger society as 
simply symptomatic of the sinful or non-sinful condition of 
each individual. Thus, the confessional approach does not 
completely ignore the world beyond the individual, although 
it does not focus on directly using the institutions of larger 
society. It is this confessional approach then which seems to 
be the least authoritarian interpretation of Augustine since it 
focuses more on personal transformation than institutional 
change. It is also for this reason that I think this approach 
squares most with the way that I wish to use Augustine’s 
philosophy for sustainable living. The confessional 
approach’s focus on individual transformation resonates 
with Gadotti’s idea of changing one’s personal values and  
 
 
38 Hoon Woo, “Pilgrim’s Progress”, 428. 
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attitudes in order to live sustainably. The implicit argument 
of the confessional approach, namely, that it is through 
one’s rectifying of one’s self that society can also be 
rectified, parallels Gadotti and Pappass’ idea that sustainable 
development can only truly come about if there is a change 
of values in the individual level. In light of this, I shall also 
consider my appropriation of Augustine’s philosophy as a 
variant of the confessional approach, which aims to use 
Augustine’s thought to bring about positive personal 
transformation. 
Finally, let me proceed to the third objection which is the 
problem of how a crucial element in Augustine’s philosophy, 
namely “grace,” can be integrated in a contemporary 
framework for sustainable living. It is well known that 
Augustine stresses the necessity of grace for man to achieve 
anything truly good. This implies the well-known dichotomy 
between man’s “natural capacity” and God’s “supernatural 
grace,” the former being unable to achieve true goodness 
without being supported by the latter. Of course, the 
difficulty of applying this idea to a non-theological 
worldview of sustainability is that there is no God to grant 
grace. It would seem then that judged from an 
“Augustinian” lens, all the efforts at character improvement 
that the aforesaid worldview would promote will ultimately 
be in vain, since such a natural effort will not be suffused by 
supernatural grace. A further difficulty is that even if 
somehow supernatural grace were to be incorporated in the 




aforesaid worldview, Augustine believes that only a limited 
number of human beings actually receive this grace.40 From 
these considerations, it must be admitted that it is simply not 
possible to reconcile Augustine’s original views about grace 
with the above-mentioned worldview.  
Nevertheless, I do believe that a qualified notion of grace 
can still be incorporated in a contemporary worldview for 
sustainability. But why even attempt such incorporation? My 
answer is that the notion of grace can engender in people a 
sense of gratitude for all the good things that they have 
received. This in turn can serve as an impetus for sustainable 
living. I will discuss more of this later.  
A modified understanding of grace can be integrated in a 
worldview for sustainability. In Augustine’s thought, grace 
may be understood in two ways, and this is what Eugene 
Teselle calls the notion of “double gratuity” in Augustine’s 
works. 41  The first gratuity is the actual existence of a 
creature, while the second gratuity is the grace that God 
gives to the creature so that it can achieve its perfection. For 
instance, in the Confessions, Augustine says that not only is 
the everlasting experience of the beatific vision by the good 
angels a grace from God, but the very capacity of these 
 
40 De civ. Dei, 21.12. For an English translation, it is advised to see the 
translation of Marcus Dods (1887) since the translation of Walsh et al. does 
not contain the cited book and chapter. 
41 Eugene TeSelle, “Nature and Grace in Augustine’s Expositions of Genesis 
I, 1-5,” Recherches Augustiniennes 5 (1968): 97. 




angels for the vision, that is to say their existence, is also 
itself a grace.42 
I believe that grace in this sense of “first gratuity” is what 
can be better adopted for a worldview of sustainability. This 
is because grace as “first gratuity” is not Divine favor given 
only to a particular group of beings. Rather, this first gratuity 
extends to all beings insofar as they exist. It may be objected 
though that this grace would still require a God who gives it. 
However, contemporary conceptions of grace show that this 
need not be the case. For example, John Caputo considers 
as grace the very wonder that is our existence—something 
which we did not ask for, but received nonetheless, like a 
gift.43 He does not exclude the possibility of a God giving 
this grace to us, but he also does not consider it necessary. 
To illustrate this, Caputo uses an example from Friedrich 
Nietzsche. In his essay, “On Truth and Lies in the 
Nonmoral Sense,” Nietzsche begins with this short 
anecdote: 
Once upon a time, in some out of the way 
corner of the universe which is dispersed into 
numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a 
star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. 
That was the most arrogant and mendacious 
 
42 Confessionum, 13.1. I have used the translation by John K. Ryan (1960) in 
all citations. 
43 John Caputo, Truth: Philosophy in Transit (London: Penguin Books, 2013), 
259–260. 




minute of ‘world history,’ but nevertheless, it was 
only a minute. After nature had drawn a few 
breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the 
clever beasts had to die.44 
The implication of this story is that humans are but 
insignificant and fleeting specks in the universe, and that it is 
conceited of them to think that they are something more, 
particularly in the sense of them being able to know the true 
knowledge of things. However, Caputo suggests an 
alternative to Nietzsche’s trivializing view. For Caputo, the 
fact that, for a moment in the universe’s life, there was a 
place in it where creatures fortuitously arose capable of 
thought and language—a place where the universe could 
“know itself” as it were—should be considered a thing of 
wonder, and indeed, of gratitude.45 It is both this “cosmic 
luck” that brought us to existence, as well as the very 
wonder of our existence as creatures aware of the universe, 
which Caputo believes can be considered as a grace given to 
us, regardless of whether there is a divine giver of this grace 
or not. 
This idea of grace as existence itself also leads us beyond 
the dichotomy of “natural” human effort and “supernatural” 
grace mentioned above. If grace is the very gift of our being, 
then this means that grace is already “natural.” In other 
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words, grace is that which is already given to human beings 
at the very start, and whatever striving for goodness they 
carry out is only possible due to this grace, and is only a 
response to this grace. In the context of living sustainably, 
grace need not be considered as supernatural aid which is 
necessary to ensure the perfection of one’s actions. Rather, 
grace can be considered as the very “givenness” of one’s 
existence. The effort to live sustainably can be understood 
as a response to this grace, similar to how Augustine 
believed that his striving for union with God was already a 
response to the initial graces of being created and converted 
by Him.46 This leads to what I said above about how the 
notion of grace can promote an attitude of gratitude. If 
indeed human beings have received life from the universe 
without them even asking for it, then it seems that the 
primary disposition that human beings should have in 
relation to the universe is one of gratitude. Again, this 
attitude does not need to be directed at a specific deity or 
personality, although there is nothing that prevents this 
either. It can be directed to the natural world that continues 
to nourish humankind and also to the human world to 
which all human beings owe their cultural and social 
identities. In any case, having this “virtue” of gratitude can 
serve as an impetus for people to live sustainably, leading 
them to realize that they have received so much from the 
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world. In return, they respond to the world’s generosity by 
being responsible in their use of the its resources—although 
it is likely that they can never fully repay their “debt.”  
Augustine’s Potential Contribution to the Idea of Sustainable Development 
Now that I have addressed the objections, I would like to 
show how ideas from Augustine’s philosophy can enhance 
the concept of sustainable development in such a manner 
that address the issues alluded by Gadotti above. I provide 
two ways: One is that Augustine’s conception of a 
hierarchical universe, which shows that things have unequal 
ontological value but are nevertheless all intrinsically good, 
can help strike a balance between the two extreme 
interpretations of sustainable development, namely, that of 
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. The second has to do 
with the focus of Augustine’s philosophy on love as the 
primary force that directs and molds human beings. For 
Augustine, the loves that people have determine their 
character, and ultimately, their effects on the world. Indeed, 
so fundamental is love that in the City of God, Augustine 
divides the entire human race based on the two basic, but 
opposing, loves, namely, love of God over self and love of 
self over God.47 I believe that this focus on a person’s loves 
resonates with Gadotti and Pappas’ emphasis on the 
importance of a person’s values in promoting sustainable 
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development. In other words, sustainable development can 
only come about if the values or loves of human beings are 
ordered towards achieving sustainability. Again, more of this 
will be expounded in the succeeding section, where I further 
explain Augustine’s ideas in the City of God. 
Order, Ordered Love, and Temporal Peace  
in Augustine’s City of God 
I believe that there are three distinguishable, but 
intertwined, concepts in Augustine’s City of God that, given 
some modifications, can serve as material for a basic 
worldview for living sustainably. The first is the concept of 
“order,” which Augustine believes presides, or should 
preside, over all of creation. The second is the concept of 
ordo amoris, or rightly ordered love. For Augustine, human 
beings should nourish love for things that correspond to the 
cosmic order just mentioned. The third concept is “temporal 
peace,” which, for, Augustine is the end of a strictly earthly 
life. In the remainder of this section, I will elaborate on 
these three concepts, and in the last section (An 
Augustinian-Inspired Worldview for Sustainable Living) I 
will suggest how they can be modified to serve as material 
for a worldview of sustainable living. 
On Order 
Let me begin then with the concept of order, which 
Augustine defines as “an arrangement of like and unlike 
things whereby each of them is disposed in its proper 




place.”48  For Augustine, order encompasses the whole of 
creation and this order is manifested in the fact that all 
creatures are part of a hierarchy in which they have varying 
degrees of value. In the City of God, Augustine describes this 
hierarchy as follows:49 
Among all things which somehow exist and 
which can be distinguished from God who made 
them, those that live are ranked higher than 
those that do not . . . [among] living things, the 
sentient are superior to the non-sentient, for 
example, animals to trees. Among sentient 
beings, the intelligent are higher than the non-
intelligent, as with men and cattle. Among the 
intelligent, the immortal are superior to the 
mortal, as angels to men. 
Now it might seem that, by establishing gradation, and 
therefore inequality, among beings, Augustine is in danger of 
reducing the worth of certain beings, particularly those in 
the “lower tiers” of the hierarchy. However, if one looks at 
the context of Augustine’s overall thought, one will see that 
the purpose of this hierarchy is not to degrade the worth of 
beings but to affirm their goodness.  As was said above, 
Augustine believed in the natural goodness of all creatures. 
Aside from this, he also believed that creatures have value, 
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insofar as they contribute to the beauty of the universe. But, 
as was also mentioned above, creatures contribute to the 
overall beauty of the universe not by being all equally 
beautiful in the same respect. Rather, it is precisely by being 
different from each other, and yet still acting in harmony 
with each other, that creatures are able to make up the 
beautiful whole that is the universe—just like how the 
different parts of the human body are not uniformly alike, 
and yet by their very non-uniformity form the elegant whole 
which is the body. With regards to the beauty of the 
universe therefore, even the most insignificant, unseemly, 
and even harmful creature is a necessary contributor to it.  
Augustine’s idea of a hierarchy, then, far from being an 
instrument for the devaluation of creatures, is meant to 
convey the inherent worth that all creatures have as being 
part of a beautiful universe, which in turn is the 
manifestation of God’s wisdom. The idea of the hierarchy 
also gives a sense of interconnection among all creatures 
since it implies that every creature ultimately has a place in 
the greater scheme of things. And as said above, this 
concept of hierarchy can strike a balance between the 
extremes of anthropocentrism and ecocentrism. On the one 
hand, Augustine believes that human beings are at the top of 
this hierarchy of earthly creatures, and that means that 
human beings can legitimately use and consume animals and 
plants for their own benefit. Simultaneously, precisely by 
being part of this hierarchy of beings created by God, 




animals and plants also have intrinsic goodness apart from 
the utility that human beings see in them. Therefore, it 
would also be an evil if human beings destroy animals and 
plants to the point of extinction. This would mar the 
beautiful order made by God, similar to what Augustine said 
above of how a body in losing its parts would be deprived of 
its beauty. Moreover, wantonly destroying non-human living 
beings would, as also mentioned above, betray a very 
narrow, anthropocentric view of the world. Finally, the 
desire of humans to annihilate entire species of animals 
simply because they are an inconvenience is, Augustine 
believes, likely brought about by passion instead of reason, 
which in turn is a deviation from rightly ordered love.50 To 
this idea we turn to next. 
On Rightly Ordered Love 
According to Francisco Benzoni, Augustine understands 
love in two ways. Love can be understood as a tendency 
toward an object (desire) and the rest that results from 
attaining the object (joy).51 Understood this way, these two 
senses of love are just two distinct parts of the process of 
loving. For Augustine, this process of loving and the order 
of the universe are closely connected. This is because the 
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aforesaid order consists of the things of the universe tending 
towards their proper places, if not already resting in it. Thus, 
Augustine at times use the word love analogically to describe 
the movement of all kinds of beings toward their proper 
“niche” within the greater scheme of things. For example, in 
the City of God, Augustine says that animals love the “carnal 
life of the senses” which is their “sufficient good,” and that 
once they obtain this they would “seek nothing further.”52 
Likewise, Augustine says that trees, although not having 
any consciousness, tend toward fruitfulness.53 Finally, even 
lifeless things like “waves, winds or flames,” tend toward 
their proper places due to the gravity of their bodies.54 For 
example, flames would go up because of their lightness, 
while water would go down because of its weight.  
In following their proper “loves,” therefore, all things 
contribute to the order of the universe. Humans are no 
different, and their capacity for intellect and free will allow 
them to love in the full sense of choosing and desiring a 
good that is consciously apprehended. Now, Augustine 
believes that the primary good that man should tend 
towards is none other than God, the supreme good. 
However, since human beings have free will, they do not 
automatically tend towards their proper object of love like 
other earthly creatures do. Moreover, human beings often 
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do not love God in the manner that they should, mainly due 
to the effect of original sin. According to Augustine, the first 
sin of Adam and Eve had two disastrous effects on the rest 
of the human race.55 One is ignorance, or the lack of the 
intimate knowledge of God that the first couple enjoyed in 
the Garden of Eden. The second is the difficulty of human 
reason to control the baser appetites, leading humans to lust 
over created things. These two effects can be summed into 
only one: that human beings no longer love God above all 
things, but instead tend to love themselves most of all.  
This disordered love in turn harms the order that exists in 
human beings themselves and the rest of creation. This 
disordered love disrupts the order of the human being 
because, as mentioned, it results in the loss of reason’s 
power over the passions or lower appetites. But, aside from 
inflicting harm on the order of the human’s soul, inordinate 
desire can also injure the order of the human body. It is a 
common notion, after all, that things often hurt people 
when acquired and used excessively. Augustine gives the 
example of food and drink, which although are necessary for 
the physical well-being of humans, can nevertheless harm 
them when taken immoderately.56 Finally, besides inflicting 
damage to the order of their own selves, humans also 
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damage the order of the external world because of their 
immoderate desires. This is what Augustine means when he 
says that the desire of human beings to extinguish species of 
animals is due more to their passions than their reason. That 
is to say, it is due to the irrational drive to convenience 
themselves that human beings are led to the extreme of 
wishing, and indeed acting out, the extinction of entire 
species. 
It is because of these undesirable consequences of 
inordinate love that the idea of rightly ordered love becomes 
vital. To clarify, for Augustine, loving God above all things 
does not mean that one should not love creatures. Rather, it 
means that love of creatures should never be in the same 
degree of love for God. More specifically, a person should 
love creatures ultimately out of love for God, so that one’s 
love for creatures must always be such that it aligns with 
one’s love for God. Thus, one should not commit sin 
against God for the sake of loving a creature. For example, 
my love for my friend does not mean that I cooperate with 
him in murder. Similarly, my love for food should not lead 
me to gluttony. In other words, rightly ordered love entails 
that in all my relationships with creatures, I should take care 
not to damage the most important relationship which is that 
between God and me. And indeed, it is precisely by 
preserving my primary relationship with God that I also 
ensure that the relationships I have with other creatures are 




correct, and that, consequently, I do not disturb the order of 
the world through inordinate desires. 
Now I believe that Augustine’s philosophy of rightly 
ordered love can play a significant role in a worldview for 
sustainability, because it shows a way of remedying the 
disordered attachments to things that people have, which 
often lead to excessive material consumption and 
unsustainable living. As Benzoni says, in our increasingly 
materialistic culture, people often define themselves in terms 
of material possessions.57 The solution for this, then, is that 
people should learn to love material goods in a non-absolute 
way, just as how Augustine’s rightly ordered love entails 
loving creatures non-absolutely. This means that material 
goods are not supposed to be the ultimate object of love 
but, rather, they are supposed to be objects of love that are 
subordinated and referred to a higher principle. For 
Augustine, this higher principle, is of course God, and his 
philosophy of rightly ordered love would never allow it to 
be otherwise. Hence, similar to Augustine’s idea of grace, I 
do not think that Augustine’s original philosophy of ordo 
amoris can be integrated in a contemporary worldview for 
sustainability. 
However, I believe that there is still a possibility to 
reconcile Augustine’s philosophy of rightly ordered love  
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with the goal of sustainability. This is because Augustine 
does provide another principle or object of love that, 
although subordinate to God, is still something he considers 
most important for earthly life. Moreover, this object can be 
made as a goal by a person, whether or not she believes in 
something like Augustine’s God. This object is what he calls 
“temporal peace.” 
On Temporal Peace 
To explain what temporal peace is, it would be good to 
first explore Augustine’s understanding of peace itself. In 
the City of God, Augustine defines peace as “the calm that 
comes from order.”58 This means that peace is what results 
when the order in the universe is realized, which in turn 
occurs when things move towards and finally rest in their 
proper places. Analogically, peace can refer to the purposes 
or ends of these very movements. For example, when it 
comes to living things such as animals, Augustine says that 
self-preservation and propagation of their species is their 
peace.59 With regards to human beings, Augustine believes 
that their ultimate peace is eternal life with God. However, 
although Augustine acknowledges that life in heaven is 
where man will achieve his true peace, he also admits that in 
this mortal life there is a kind of peace that is still worth 
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striving for, namely, the peace of human societies on earth.60 
This “temporal peace” consists of an “ordered harmony of 
authority and obedience between citizens”61 through which 
these citizens attain for themselves the material goods 
necessary for mortal existence.62 These goods include those 
needed for the preservation of “health, security, and human 
fellowship” such as “air to breath, water to drink, everything 
that goes to feed, clothe, cure, and beautify the body.”63 
From this definition, it can easily be understood why 
Augustine thinks that those who have God as their highest 
goal should still exert effort in promoting this temporal 
peace. This is because having the necessary amount of 
material goods for physical living is a general condition for 
being able to live virtuously. 
Temporal peace then is the fulfillment of a “purely 
human life”—a life which does not take into account the 
supernatural and highest end of man, which is eternal life 
with God.64 Although Augustine does not believe that this 
earthly peace is man’s highest good, he considers it of 
enough significance that he expects both the people who 
have a rightly ordered love and those who have a disordered 
love, to work together in establishing it. As he says in the 
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City of God, “For as mortal life is the same for all, there 
ought to be common cause between the two cities [that is to 
say between the people who have rightly ordered love and 
disordered love] in what concerns our purely human 
living.”65 This idea that temporal peace is such a significant 
goal that even people aiming for different ultimate ends 
should work together to achieve it, is something which I 
believe can make temporal peace an appropriate goal of a 
worldview for sustainable living. This I will explore in the 
next section below where I shall attempt to utilize the 
concepts of Augustine that I have discussed to draw a rough 
sketch of, precisely, this aforesaid worldview. 
An Augustinian-Inspired Worldview for Sustainable Living 
To begin this application of Augustine’s philosophy to a 
worldview of sustainable living, I would first like to expand 
the scope of temporal peace from Augustine’s original 
interpretation. If temporal peace should be the aim of 
sustainable living and development, then this peace should 
be enlarged to include the world beyond human civilization, 
namely, that of nature and the environment. Specifically, I 
suggest that the scope of temporal peace should encompass 
the biosphere of the earth itself. In any case, this 
modification is pretty much in line with Augustine’s 
thought. If peace for Augustine is the state where all things 
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rest in their proper niche in the universe, it would indeed 
seem appropriate if temporal peace includes not merely 
human civilization but the natural world beyond it. Also, if 
Augustine believes that the universe is a whole that depends 
upon its parts, then taking care of only one of its parts, 
namely human civilization, will not result in its peace. Now, 
as said above, the idea of temporal peace being the highest 
goal for human beings cannot be reconciled with 
Augustine’s original understanding of rightly ordered love 
wherein God is precisely the ultimate goal. However, as also 
mentioned above, when it comes to “purely human living,” 
Augustine does consider temporal peace to be the primary 
goal. Now a worldview for sustainability is arguably one that 
is confined to this purely human living since it does not 
concern itself with the supernatural or other-worldly ends 
that human beings might have. Therefore, it would not seem 
inappropriate to posit temporal peace as the highest goal for 
this worldview.  
Thus, in my sketch of a worldview for sustainability, 
temporal peace, understood as the goal of maintaining the 
integrity of the earth’s biosphere, would serve as the highest 
goal. And as long as we precisely keep in mind the 
qualification that this worldview is only concerned with the 
purely human life, then even those who believe in a greater 
goal for human beings beyond this life should generally not 
find anything objectionable with such a worldview—much 
like Augustine himself, who saw no incongruence between 




striving for temporal peace on the one hand, and loving 
God above all things on the other. 
What then would be the more specific implications of this 
worldview? For one, such a worldview would entail that the 
desire that people have for creatures, whether plants, 
animals, or fellow human beings, should ultimately be 
referred back to their love of the continuous existence and 
“peace” of the biosphere. In other words, people’s love for 
other creatures and even for themselves should not threaten 
to disturb or damage the biosphere as a whole. To give a 
concrete example, let us say that I am walking through a 
nature reserve and am currently enjoying what I am 
experiencing. As I take pleasure in the pleasant milieu, I am 
careful not to litter carelessly even though it might be more 
convenient for me to just throw my trash in some obscure 
place in the park than finding a garbage bin which might be 
far off. And this is because I have the desire not simply to 
enjoy the nature reserve but to preserve it because it is 
ultimately part of the biosphere. Moreover, I am aware that, 
in taking care of the biosphere through this action of 
maintaining the cleanliness of the nature reserve, I would 
also ultimately contribute to the general well-being of all 
living creatures in the planet. 
Now perhaps a less easy example is when it comes to 
consuming animals or plants. It might not be that self-
evident as to how a person still primarily values preserving 
the biosphere if he is engaging in the activity of eating other 




life forms. Nevertheless, I also believe that desiring the good 
of the biosphere is possible even when one is consuming 
plants and animals. As said above, Augustine believed that 
the peace of animals is in their continuing survival and 
propagation. If that is the case, then as long as a person is 
careful that she is not consuming animals in such a way that 
she is contributing to drastic reduction of their species, then 
she can still consume or use such animals without going 
against temporal peace. The same principle can be applied to 
plant species, and I believe even to the inanimate physical 
world. Inanimate resources of nature, such as water, should 
be used but not to the point of reducing the amount in a 
manner that proves detrimental to the environment. To be 
sure though, the worldview that I am sketching out will still 
follow Augustine’s belief that humans are the most valuable 
of earthly creatures. Considering the preservation of the 
biosphere as the highest goal does not mean compromising 
human worth, but it simply means that human beings 
should not love themselves to the point that they are 
endangering the totality of beings on the earth by 
substantially reducing or even extinguishing species of living 
beings. It is this excessive destruction of species and natural 
resources that is more likely the effect of disordered love 
and the disturber of the biosphere’s order. 
Perhaps borrowing from Augustine’s metaphor of the 
body would help clarify my point more. It is no great harm 
for the human body to lose certain parts such as hair, nails, 




skin, or baby teeth. The reason for this is because these 
parts grow back anyway, and sometimes it is even in line 
with the body’s natural growth for these parts to be 
removed. What is however often considered a substantial 
harm to the body is that if it loses a part which cannot grow 
back, and if such loss is not part of its natural growth; for 
example, if a certain limb is maimed. It is arguably this kind 
of loss which Augustine considers as that which mars the 
general beauty of the body. Applying this metaphor to the 
biosphere, it might be said that it is no great harm to the 
biosphere if certain life forms are consumed as long as the 
rate of consumption is such that it allows the regeneration 
of the species of these life forms. Moreover, it is part of the 
nature of the biosphere that life forms consume each other. 
However, the consumption of living creatures at a rate 
which does not allow them to regenerate their population, 
and thus a consumption that can be generally considered 
unnatural, can be understood as that which truly mars the 
beauty and peace of the biosphere. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have attempted to show how the 
resources of Saint Augustine’s philosophy can serve as 
material for sketching a basic worldview that can promote 
sustainable living, which in turn is urgently needed in these 
times. In doing this, I hope not only to point out the 
perennial value of the Saint’s thought, but also the 
possibility for those who work for sustainable development 




to look for resources in the wisdom of past thinkers who 
may initially seem remote to their concerns. It might just be 
these thinkers who have the answers to what they are 
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